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COMPARABLE WORTH CLAIMS UNDER TITLE VII: DOES
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORT AN INFERENCE OF
DISCRIMINATORY INTENT?-American Federation of State,
County, and Municipal Employees v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th
Cir. 1985).
In American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees v.
Washington, 1 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that proof of unequal
pay for jobs of comparable worth is not sufficient to establish a prima facie
case of sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2
Comparable worth theory postulates that sex-based wage discrimination
exists if employees in job classifications occupied primarily by women are
paid less than employees in predominantly male classifications, if the
evaluated worth of the jobs is equal.3 Although courts have rejected this
theory with near uniformity, some assert that the viability of comparable
worth claims has not been fully explored. 4
This Note suggests that comparable worth theory, as a means of proving
discrimination under Title VII, has been fully explored and charted, and
observes that comparable worth claims have gained virtually no ground in
legal battles against sex-based wage discrimination. Where courts have
upheld such claims, their decisions have turned on the accompanying
evidence of discriminatory intent, rather than on the inference of intent
drawn from comparable worth studies. Moreover, since many factors
provide plausible explanations of wage differentials, courts are correct in
rejecting comparable worth claims that are unsupported by additional
evidence of intentional discrimination. The Ninth Circuit was correct in
rejecting the claim of the American Federation of State, County, and
Municipal Employees (AFSCME) because AFSCME failed to provide
1. 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985)(AFSCMEII).
2. Id. at 1408. Title VII is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982) (see infra note 14 for text).
3. AFSCME 1I, 770 F.2d at 1404. See COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVNEs 3 (E.
Livernash 2d ed. 1984). Comparable worth has been operationally defined as "the application of a
single bias-free point factor evaluation system within a given establishment, across job families, both to
rank-order jobs and to set salaries." Remick, The Comparable Worth Controversy, 10 PuB. PERSONNEL
MGMT. J 371,377 (1981). For purposes of this Note, comparable worth will be considered a method of
identifying wage discrimination, rather than a means of operationally setting equitable pay relation-
ships.
4. See Bohm v. L.B. Hartz Wholesale Corp., 370 N.W.2d 901,918 (Minn. App. 1985) (Crippen,
J., dissenting); BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAiRS, PAY EQurrv AND COMPARABLE WomR 94-95 (1984)
(statement by Winn Newman, former general counsel for American Federation of State, County, and
Municipal Employees (AFSCME)) [hereinafter cited as PAY EQurrY AND COMPARABLE WObm];
Comment, Comparable Worth: TheNextStep Toward PayEquity Under Title VII, 62 DEN. L. REv. 417,
418 (1985).
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additional evidence which, together with evidence of pay disparities be-
tween jobs of comparable worth, would support an inference of discrimi-
natory intent. Since comparable worth claims have not succeeded in federal
courts, their future lies in nonjudicial forums, such as legislatures and
collective bargaining.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF AFSCME'S CLAIM
A. The Concept of Comparable Worth
Proponents of comparable worth perceive a job market where discrimi-
nation against women persists, despite federal legislation prohibiting sex-
based discrimination in employment. 5 They feel that one form of discrimi-
nation is the segregation of women into low-paying occupations, either by a
process of socialization or by conscious efforts on the part of employers. 6
Another form of discrimination, they contend, is the projection of past
discriminatory wage scales into current pay rates. 7 These assertions are
prompted by statistics indicating wage disparities that have persisted for
decades in the national labor market. 8 Women's median full-time earnings
in 1955 were 64% of men's, 9 and by 1983 had risen only slightly to 66.2%
of men's earnings. 10
Proponents of comparable worth reason that, since studies revealed
higher pay for predominantly male jobs than for predominantly female jobs
of comparable worth, the disparities are presumptively due to discrimina-
tion. I I Studies that extend the inquiry to the underlying causes of wage
5. See generally Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation, and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 399, 402-08 (1979); England, Socioeconomic Explanations
of Job Segregation, in COMPARABLE WORTH AND WAGE DISCRIMINATION 28, 28-43 (H. Remick ed.
1984); COMMITTEE ON PAY EQUITY, MANUAL ON PAY EQUITY 16 (J. Grune ed. 1980)[hereinafter cited as
MANUAL ON PAY EQUITY].
6. Blumrosen, supra note 5, at 415-57; Steinberg, "A Want of Harmony": Perspectives on Wage
Discrimination and Comparable Worth, in COMPARABLE WORTH AND WAGE DISCRIMINATION 3, 16-17
(H. Remick ed. 1984).
7. Blumrosen, supra note 5, at 443-44.
8. Steinberg, supra note 6, at 3-5.
9. Id. at5.
10. R. WILLIAMS & L. KESSLER, A CLOSER LOOK AT COMPARABLE WORTH 5-6 (1984). The ratio of
women's wages to men's wages varies "from a low of 49.8% in retail, trades, and sales [occupations], to
a high of 90.5% in health workers (except physicians, dentists, and related practitioners)"(footnote
omitted). Remick, supra note 3, at 372 (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WOMEN'S BUREAU, THE
EARNINGS GAP BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN (1979)).
11. R. WILLIAMS & L. KESSLER, supra note 10, at 23-25. See also Blumrosen, Wage Discrimina-
tion and Job Segregation: The Survival of a Theory, 14 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 5-6 (1980); Milkovich, The
Emerging Debate, in COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES 23, 42-47 (E. Livernash 2d ed.
1984); Note, Comparable Worth and the Presumption of Equality: What Does "Justice" Require?, 87
W. VA. L. REV. 837, 838 (1985). The feasibility of measuring the worth of jobs is the subject of an
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disparities, however, have been unable to single out that portion of wage
differentials attributable to discrimination. 1 2 Studies measuring worker
productivity attribute up to half of the pay disparity to legitimate, non-
discriminatory factors, such as age, experience, and education. 13 Since
numerous factors affect wage rates, courts have turned to traditional dis-
crimination analysis to determine whether plaintiffs are entitled to relief
under Title VII.
B. Theories of Title VII Litigation
Comparable worth claims usually arise under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,14 which prohibits discrimination in the terms or
compensation of employment on the basis of sex. Prior to the Civil Rights
Act, wage discrimination actions were limited to those available under the
Equal Pay Act,15 which mandates that workers be given equal pay for equal
work. 16 Whether the Civil Rights Act encompassed any claims beyond
entirely separate debate which is beyond the scope of this Note. See generally Freed & Polsby,
Comparable Worth in the Equal Pay Act, 51 U. Cn. L. REv. 1078 (1984); Nelson, Opton, & Wilson,
Wage Discrimination and the "Comparable Worth" Theory in Perspective, 13 U. MICH. J.L. RE. 233
(1980).
12. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES 42 (D. Treiman & H. Hartmann
ed. 1981).
13. As noted in WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES, supra note 12, a study by Corcoran andDunn (1979),
considered to be the most thorough of studies using worker characteristics to account for pay
disparities, used a variety of factors categorized under the general headings of work history, indications
of labor force attachment, and formal education. Id. at 19-22. Absent from the study, however, were
factors such as collective bargaining strength and nonpecuniary benefits which may not be reflected in
pay. Studies which use job characteristics, rather than worker characteristics, as explanatory variables
are also inadequate in identifying the cause of wage differentials. Id. at 38-39.
14. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982), states in
relevant part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.
15. The Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C.§ 206(d)(1) (1982).
16. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1982), provides:
No employer. . . shall discriminate. . . between employees on the basis of sex by paying
wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to
employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of
which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar
working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a
merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a
differential based on any factor other than sex.
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those allowed by the Equal Pay Act remained uncertain, until the United
States Supreme Court's decision in County of Washington v. Gunther. 17 In
Gunther, the Court examined the Bennett Amendment to Title VII, 18 which
reconciled the Civil Rights Act and the Equal Pay Act by incorporating the
affirmative defenses of the Equal Pay Act into Title VII. 19 The employer in
Gunther argued that the Bennett Amendment was intended to restrict Title
VII claims to those available under the Equal Pay Act.20 The Court rejected
this contention, holding that discrimination suits are not limited to the
equal-pay-for-equal-work cause of action provided under the Equal Pay
Act.2 ' At the same time, however, the Court emphasized that the case
before it did not involve comparable worth,22 and declined to define "the
precise contours of lawsuits challenging sex discrimination .... ",23
Suits based on comparable worth, then, were not foreclosed.
Subsequently, lower courts have addressed comparable worth claims
through two methods of analysis generally applied to Title VII cases. The
first method, disparate impact, enables plaintiffs to establish a prima facie
case of discrimination by showing that a facially neutral employment
practice, not justified by business necessity, has an uneven-or dispa-
rate-impact on the plaintiff or the plaintiff's class. 24 The second method,
disparate treatment, requires plaintiffs to prove that the employer inten-
tionally discriminated by using impermissible considerations in its employ-
ment policies.25
17. 452 U.S. 161 (1981). In Gunther, the plaintiffs were women employed as guards in the female
section of the county jail. Id. at 163-64. They alleged that wage differentials were attributable to
intentional sex discrimination, since the county set the pay scale for female guards, but not for male
guards, at a level lower than that warranted by its own survey of outside markets and the worth of the
jobs. Id. at 164. Prior to Gunther a majority of federal courts rejected discrimination claims based solely
on comparable worth. See Lemons v. City & County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 888 (1980); Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977); Gerlach v. Michigan Bell Tel.
Co., 501 . Supp. 1300 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982).
19. The Gunther Court noted that certain practices are excluded from Title VII's prohibitions by
the Bennett Amendment, including wage differentials attributable to seniority, merit, quantity or
quality of production, or "any other factor other than sex." Gunther, 452 U.S. at 167-68 (quoting
relevant portions of the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1982)).
20. Gunther, 452 U.S. at 168.
21. Id. at 181.
22. Id. at 180-81. Apparently the Court did not consider the claim to be one involving comparable
worth because it did not require the Court to make its own assessment of the value of the jobs. Id. at 181.
Rather, the claim asserted intentional discrimination as the motivation for the employer's practice of
setting female employees' wages below the levels indicated by the employer's own survey of outside
markets and the value of the jobs. Id. at 164-65.
23. Id. at 181. The Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's order remanding the case and instructing the
district court to take evidence on the employees' allegations that wage differentials were attributable to
sex discrimination. Id. at 165-66.
24. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-33 (1971).
25. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). In McDonnell Douglas the
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Under either theory, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a prepon-
derance of the evidence a prima facie case of sex discrimination. 26 The
plaintiff's ultimate burden of proving the employer's discrimination never
shifts. 27 However, when a prima facie case of discrimination is established
by a preponderance of the evidence, the burden of production shifts to the
employer. 28 In a disparate impact case, the employer may rebut the plain-
tiff's prima facie case by showing that the challenged employment practice
was justified by business necessity.29 In a disparate treatment case, the
employer need only present evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its employment practice. 30 The employer is not required to show
that it was motivated by the stated reasons, but only that a genuine issue of
fact exists as to whether it discriminated against the employee. 31 If the
employer succeeds in rebutting plaintiff's claims, the burden of production
petitioner's application for employment was rejected by the employer. Id. at 796. The Court stated that a
prima facie case of discrimination could be established by a showing that the petitioner (i) belonged to a
racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking
applicants; (iii) that he was rejected; and (iv) that after his rejection the job remained open and the
employer continued to seek applicants having the petitioner's qualifications. Id. at 802. From these facts
it could be inferred that impermissible factors guided the employer's hiring decisions. The Court added
that, since facts vary in Title VII cases, the foregoing formula is not necessarily applicable in all cases.
Id. at 802 n. 13. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical in disparate treatment cases, although it can be
inferred from the employer's less favorable treatment of certain persons because of their race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335
n.15 (1977).
26. Texas Dep'tof Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,252-53 (1981). Therequirements
of a prima facie case differ depending upon which theory is being pursued. In a disparate impact claim,
the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case is met by showing that the challenged practice has a
significantly discriminatory impact. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982). Under a disparate
treatment theory, a prima facie case may be established by showing facts supporting an inference of
discriminatory intent. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253; American Federation of State, County, and Municipal
Employees v. Washington (AFSCME 1), 578 F. Supp. 846, 858 (W.D. Wash. 1983). This may be
accomplished through statistical evidence bolstered by circumstantial evidence of discrimination. Gay
v. Waiters' & Dairy Lunchmen's Union, Local No. 30, 694 F2d 531, 553 (9th Cir. 1982).
27. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 (1981).
28. Id. at 253-56. The employer has only a burden ofproduction, not the burden ofpersuasion. The
burden of production is that of producing satisfactory evidence of a particular fact in issue, while the
burden of persuasion requires the proponent to persuade the trier of fact that the alleged fact is true.
MCCORMICK ON Evm mce 947 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
29. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. In Griggs, the Court stated that the employer could meet the business
necessity test by demonstrating that its high school completion requirement and its general intelligence
test each bore a relation to job performance. Id.
30. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. In the case of an allegation of wage discrimination, the employer
might rebut with legitimate reasons for its employment practices, such as: disruptive or unlawful acts by
the plaintiff employees against the employer, McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 806; the necessity of
adjusting pay scales in order to attract qualified employees to particular occupations, Christensen v.
State of Iowa, 563 F2d 353, 355 (8th Cir. 1977); Briggs v. City of Madison, 536 F Supp. 435, 447
(V.D. Wis. 1982); or differences in the occupations upon which the plaintiffs base their wage
comparisons, Lanegan-Grimm v. Library Ass'n, 560 F. Supp. 486, 494 (D. Or. 1983).
31. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55.
785
Washington Law Review Vol. 61:781, 1986
shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the proffered reasons are a pretext for
a discriminatory motive. 32 Pretext is established by showing that a discrim-
inatory reason more likely motivated the employer than a non-
discriminatory reason or that the stated reasons are not worthy of cre-
dence. 33
C. Comparable Worth in Washington State
Amidst growing awareness of market wage disparities, the State of
Washington commissioned a comparable worth study in 1974. 34 At the
time of the study, the two state civil service systems were directed by
statute to set salaries for approximately 3000 job classifications according
to prevailing market rates. 35 At the request of former Governor Daniel J.
Evans, an outside consultant identified 121 classifications as either pre-
dominantly male or female, 36 and evaluated the worth of those jobs on the
basis of knowledge and skills, mental demands, accountability, and work-
ing conditions. 37 The study revealed that, on the average, predominantly
male jobs were paid twenty percent more than predominantly female jobs
32. Id. at 256.
33. Id. Pretext may be proven by showing that an employment practice, although outwardly
legitimate, was applied unevenly. For example, an employer may refuse to hire one who has engaged in
unlawful acts against it, but only if this criterion is applied to members of all races. McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. Pretext may also be established by showing that the employer was more likely
motivated by discrimination. For example, derogatory and sexist remarks by the employer may render
pretextual the employer's explanation that differences between jobs account for pay inequities. See
Lanegan-Grimm v. Library Ass'n, 560 F. Supp. 486, 494 (D. Or. 1983).
34. NORMAN D. WILLIS & ASsOcIATES, STATE OF WASHINGTON, COMPARABLE WORTH STUDY
(September 1974) [hereinafter cited as STUDY]. Governor Evans requested the study upon recommenda-
tions of the State Personnel Board and the Higher Education Personnel Board. AFSCMEI, 578 F. Supp.
846, 861 (W.D. Wash. 1983). The purpose of the study was to "identify salary differences that may
pertain to job classes predominantly filled by men compared to job classes predominantly filled by
women, based on job worth." STUDY, at 1.
35. Wash. State Civil Service Law, 1973 WASH. LAWS 1sT Ex. SESS., ch. 75 at 668, amended by
1983 WASH. LAWS lST Ex. SEss., ch. 75 at 2077; State Higher Education Personnel Law, 1973 WASH.
LAWS 1ST Ex. SEss., ch. 75 at 669, amended by 1983 WASH. LAWS IST Ex. SEss., ch. 75 at 2073 (both
amendments adding comparable worth as a requirement of salary schedules in the two civil service
systems). See also WASH. REV. CODE §§ 41.06.155, 28B.16.110 (1985).
36. STUDY, supra note 34, at 2. A job category is considered predominantly male or female if it is
occupied by over 70% males or females. Id.
37. Id. at 5-6. The point-factor techniques employed in the Study have commonly been used by
large scale employers for many decades to assess the value of jobs. See E. JOHANSEN, COMPARABLE
WORTH: THE MYTH AND THE MOVEMENT 12-13 (1984). An evaluation team, trained and supervised by
management consultants, evaluated each classification on the basis of descriptions obtained through
position questionnaires. STUDY, supra note 34, at 4-8. The questionnaires were initially screened to
obtain those that were most complete, and that described positions most representative of their
classifications. Id. at 4-5.
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of comparable worth.38 A second phase of the study developed a compara-
ble worth salary structure setting equitable pay relationships. 39 Governor
Evans responded by budgeting seven million dollars to implement salary
structures based on comparable worth,4° but his successor, Dixie Lee Ray,
retracted the allocation.41 Subsequent inaction by the state legislature
prompted AFSCME and the Washington Federation of State Employees to
file a class action suit on July 20, 1982. In American Federation of State,
County, and Municipal Employees v. Washington (AFSCME 1),42 the union
alleged sex-based wage discrimination and sought declaratory and in-
junctive relief.
D. The District Court Opinion
The district court held that AFSCME established a prima facie case of
sex-based wage discrimination under both the disparate impact and dispa-
rate treatment analyses. 43 Disparate impact, the court held, resulted from
the defendant's facially neutral compensation system, which adversely
affected predominantly female job classifications and was not justified by a
legitimate and overriding business consideration. 44 Disparate treatment
was established by the defendant's deliberate perpetuation of a twenty
percent disparity in salaries between occupations predominated by males
and comparably valued occupations filled primarily by females. 45 Evi-
dence of discriminatory intent relied on by the court included the historical
context of wage discrimination claims46 and admissions by state officials
that pay scales were discriminatory.47 The district court awarded
38. SatDy, supra note 34, at 20.
39. NoRmAN D. Wtus & AssocIATEs, STATEOF WASHINGTON, COMPARABLEWORTH STUDy, Phase
I, 2 (Dec. 1976).
40. AFSCME , 578 F Supp. 846, 862 (W.D. Wash. 1983).
41. Id.
42. 578 F. Supp. 846, 851 (W.D. Wash. 1983). The court noted the legislature's failure to address
supplemental salary schedules which had been submitted pursuant to Washington Revised Code
§§ 41.06.160(5) and 28B.16.110. Id. at 862. The court also found a 1983 comparable worth appropria-
tion to be an inadequate remedy. Id. at 865.
43. AFSCME 1. 578 F. Supp. at 864. -
44. Id.
45. Id. The court also noted that, as the value of the jobs increased, the wage gap widened. Id. at
861, (citing STUDY, supra note 34, at 13).
46. The district court noted that, as early as the 1950's and as late as 1973, Washington State ran
help-wanted ads in the "male" and "female" columns of newspapers, and offered no evidence that sex
was a bona fide occupational qualification for the jobs advertised. AFSCMEI, 578 F Supp. at 860. The
court also noted that sex discrimination was permissible until the passage of the State's Civil Rights Law
in 1971. Id. at 866 n.11.
47. The district court cited statements, letters, and memoranda by the State Governor and the
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declaratory and injunctive relief, which required the state to compensate
employees according to the evaluated worth of their jobs.48 The court also
awarded back pay to 1979 for employees in predominantly female job
classifications who were not paid the evaluated worth of their jobs. 4 9
II. THE APPELLATE OPINION
The district court erred in concluding that the use of market wage rates,
which demonstrably results in lower pay for women than for men, is
sufficient evidence to support a prima facie case under Title VII. As the
Ninth Circuit pointed out in American Federation of State, County, and
Municipal Employees v. Washington (AFSCME I/),50 discrimination is one
of many possible causes of wage disparities. 51 The additional evidence
offered by AFSCME did not allow an inference that discrimination was a
more likely cause than any others.
A. Disparate Impact
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court on both theories of recov-
ery.52 The court first held that disparate impact analysis was unsuited to a
Director of the Department of Personnel reflecting their knowledge of sex discrimination in state
employment practices. Id. at 860. The court also noted the passage of legislation subsequent to the
filing of the instant suit, directing that $1.5 million be paid to alleviate the disparity in eight selected
classifications, and calling for salary changes to achieve comparable worth by 1993. Id. at 862. See 1983
WASH. LAWS 1ST Ex. SEss., ch. 75 at 2139.
In addition to historical evidence of pay discrimination and admissions by state officials, the district
court noted other types of circumstantial evidence which courts generally have found probative of
intentional discrimination. These included obstacles confronting applicants and/or employees, subjec-
tive employment practices resulting in a pattern disfavoring females, and the foreseeable adverse impact
of those practices. AFSCME 1, 578 F. Supp. at 858.
48. Id. at 871. Although the district court's decision did not detail the affirmative action required of
the state, it is clear that the court was mandating prospective relief in the form of equal pay for jobs of
comparable worth. For example, the court overruled the state's objections to a remedy that would
require the state to "pay the Plaintiff's (sic) their evaluated worth." Id. at 868. The court acknowledged
its duty to render a decree that will eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like
discrimination in the future. Id. at 869 (quoting Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965)).
The court also ordered that plaintiffs be awarded fringe benefits. AFSCME I, 578 F. Supp. at 871.
Although Judge Tanner did not specify the amount of relief, observers estimate that the judgment would
have cost the state about $800 million. Levit & Mahoney, The Future of Comparable Worth Theory, 56
U. CoLO. L. REv. 99, 114 (1984) (citing Lewin, A New Push to Raise Women's Pay, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1,
1984, § 3, at 1, col. 2).
49. AFSCME 1, 578 F. Supp. at 871. The court ordered that the amount of back pay awarded be
reduced by the amount of the plaintiffs' interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable
diligence. Id.
50. 770 F.2d 1401, 1407 (9th Cir. 1985).
51. Id. at 1407.
52. Id. at 1405, 1408.
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determination of whether the state's use of prevailing market rates was
discriminatory. 53 Such a practice, the court held, is not the sort of-"spe-
cific, clearly delineated employment practice applied at a single point in the
job selection process" to which disparate impact analysis is confined. 54
The Ninth Circuit's analysis closely follows the reasoning of other
decisions that have denied disparate impact claims based on comparable
worth. For example, in Spaulding v. University of Washington,55 female
faculty members alleged discrimination by comparing their salaries to
those of male faculty at other universities and in other divisions within the
University.56 The Ninth Circuit characterized the claim as a wide-ranging
allegation challenging general wage policies. 57 Such a claim, the court
held, is distinct from cases where disparate impact analysis was appropri-
ately used to examine the use of specific criteria in employment deci-
sions.58 The court concluded that when disparate impact analysis is applied
to broad-based claims, rather than to claims involving specific, clearly
delineated employment policies, it becomes "so vague as to be inapplica-
ble." 59 Numerous other decisions have found similarly broad-based chal-
lenges to employment policies inappropriate for disparate impact analy-
sis. 60
The courts' concern about the broad-based nature of comparable worth
claims overlooks a more important distinction. An employer's use of
53. Id. at 1405.
54. Id.
55. 740 F.2d 686, 697 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 511 (1984).
56. Id. at 707.
57. Id. at 707-08. The court cited Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (height and weight
requirements excluding women); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (intelligence test
which excluded minorities); and Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972) (exclusion of
applicants based on arrest records). See also American Federation of State, County, and Municipal
Employees v. County of Nassau, 609 F. Supp. 695, 712 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), where the court rejected
disparate impact analysis for the same reason (citing Wambheim v. J.C. Penney Co., 705 F.2d 1492 (9th
Cir. 1983)) (head of household status used to limit spouse's coverage under employee's medical policy),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1036 (1984); Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1982) (prior
salary used as a factor in determining current salary).
58. Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 707-08.
59. Id. at 708.
60. See, e.g., Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 768 F. 2d 1120, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 1985)(a broad-
scale attack against the gamut of the defendant's subjective employment practices-including claims
that job classifications lacked objective qualifications, that subjective criteria were used in hiring and
promoting, and that nepotism was rampant-does not constitute a challenge to a specific facially
neutral practice); Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co., 668 F. 2d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 1982) (the challenged
employment practices-failure to post job openings, promotion policies that retained black employees
at low-paying positions, and use of subjective criteria in evaluating employees-were not akin to
educational requirements, aptitude tests, and other specific practices to which the disparate impact
model traditionally has been applied); Heagney v. University of Wash., 642 F.2d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir.
1981)(disparate impact analysis is inappropriate for addressing the claim that lack of a well-defined
employment practice allowed a pattern of discrimination to exist).
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market data to determine the "going rate" for a particular occupation seems
to be just as specific and clearly delineated a practice as setting pay
according to an applicant's prior salary or education. Nevertheless, the
latter is more likely to be considered a specific employment practice worthy
of disparate impact analysis by the courts. The underlying distinction is
that the employer's use of market rates, alone, can never be impermissible,
since market rates bear a rational relationship to the value of the work. 61
Market rates always bear this rational relationship, because they reflect
factors which define the value of different jobs.62 These factors include the
availability of workers in a particular occupation and their ability to bargain
collectively for higher wages. 63
In contrast, the use of another specific employment criterion may or may
not be related to the value of the work. For example, a requirement that job
applicants must have a high school diploma may be related to many types of
work, but is probably unrelated to manual labor. If a high school diploma
was required of an applicant for a job involving manual labor, a finder of
61. The rational relationship test has been applied by courts in their determination of whether an
employer has demonstrated that the challenged employment practice is a business necessity. For
example, in Griggs, the Court implied that, had the employer's intelligence tests been shown to be
related to the employees' successful performance, they would have been deemed to fulfill a genuine
business need. 401 U.S. at 431-32; see also Shannon v. Pay 'N Save Corp., 104 Wn. 2d 722, 731, 709
P.2d 799, 806 (1985)(to establish a business necessity defense an employer must prove that a hiring or
promotion test accurately predicts or significantly correlates with the fundamental requirements ofjob
performance). Since market wage rates reflect not only the nature of the work performed, but also the
supply of workers and other factors which affect the value of work, the use of such rates is rationally
related to the employer's business needs. See infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
62. See generally Baird, Comparable Worth: The Labor Theory of Value and Worse, 6 GOV'T
UNION REV. 1, 13 (1985)(market prices reflect millions of bids that are made, accepted, and rejected by
consumers and resource owners, based on their own knowledge and goals).
63. AFSCMEII, 770 F.2d at 1407; see also Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353, 356(8th Cir. 1977);
Briggs v. City of Madison, 536 F. Supp. 435, 445 (W.D. Wis. 1982), where the court noted additional
factors such as "crowding" (a heavy concentration of women available for the same job category), and
the historical reality that many jobs characterized by some as "women's work" are jobs that have never
been well-compensated, whether they have been filled by women or by men. Other factors affecting pay
scales include nonpecuniary differences in the attractiveness of jobs and the stability or instability of
earnings expected from different jobs. Hildebrand, The Market System, in COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUES
AND ALTERNATIVES 79, 101 (E. Livernash 2d ed. 1984) (citing M. FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY: A
PROVISIONAL TEXT (1962)). Another factor, the segregation of women into a narrow range of occupa-
tions, is influenced by socialization which reinforces people into sex-typical roles. England, Socioeco-
nomic Explanations of Job Segregation, in COMPARABLE WORTH AND WAGE DISCRIMINATION 28, 29 (H.
Remick ed. 1984). The increase in the number of working women since 1950 has aggravated job
segregation by increasing the supply of workers in certain fields and thereby keeping their relative wage
rates low. Hutner, The Female-Male Earnings Gap, in MANUAL ON PAY EQUITY 15, supra note 5, at 16.
Most commentators agree that discrimination can be added to the foregoing list of factors which
influence some wage differentials. The problem is to detect discrimination and to measure its influence
separately from other factors. Hildebrand, supra, at 101.
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fact would likely infer an impermissible intent to exclude from employment
opportunities those statistically less educated. 64
B. Disparate Treatment
When jobs of comparable worth draw disparate wages, up to half of the
disparity may be attributable to legitimate, identifiable factors. 65 The
residual may or may not be attributable to discrimination. Although this
uncertainty may be addressed by either disparate impact or disparate
treatment analysis, the latter compels courts to consider evidence of
discriminatory intent, in addition to the employer's use of market wage
rates. Since this additional evidence may pinpoint intentional discrimina-
tion as the source of the wage gap, courts prefer disparate treatment
analysis when addressing Title VII comparable worth claims.
1. Order and Allocation of Proof
Whether the Ninth Circuit's rejection of AFSCME's prima facie case
was proper depends in part on the order and allocation of proof between the
parties.66 The court rejected AFSCME's prima facie case by concluding
that the state's use of market wage rates was a permissible employment
practice. 67 One could argue that the market defense should be considered as
part of the employer's burden of production in rebutting the prima facie
case. Therefore, it would follow that the Ninth Circuit deviated from the
established order of proof by considering the market defense when assess-
ing AFSCME's prima facie case.
However, an examination of the rationale behind the allocation of proof
in Title VII cases reveals that the Ninth Circuit's approach was correct. The
allocation of proof is a method of analyzing claims in light of common
experience and the probabilities of the situation. 68 A prima facie case is
established by proof of actions taken by an employer from which discrimi-
natory intent may be inferred. This inference is permitted because experi-
ence suggests that people do not act arbitrarily and that, in the absence of
other explanations, it is more likely than not that the challenged actions are
based on impermissible factors.69 Since the employer has superior access to
64. See, e.g., Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-31 (high school diploma requirement or intelligence test
found to render ineligible a disproportionate number of minority applicants; such requirements are
forbidden unless they are a reasonable measure of job performance).
65. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
66. See supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text.
67. AFSCME II, 770 F. 2d at 1406.
68. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
69. Id.
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information that may rebut a prima facie case, the burden should shift to the
employer to produce information rebutting the likelihood of discriminatory
intent.70
Where a comparable worth claim challenges the employer's use of
market rates, however, the foregoing rationale does not apply. First, as
previously noted, a disparate treatment claim under Title VII requires proof
by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer was motivated by
discriminatory intent.71 Since courts recognize many explanations for
market wage disparities, 72 discrimination by the employer is not a more
likely explanation than others. Therefore, a discrimination claim based on
the employer's use of market wage rates does not meet the preponderance
of the evidence test required of a prima facie case under Title VII.
Second, because the employer has no more knowledge than the plaintiffs
of why the market value of labor varies between occupations, there is no
justification for shifting to the employer the burden of explaining such
variations. However, if additional evidence showing intent to discriminate
is produced, the rationale underlying the allocation of proof in Title VII
cases mandates that the burden shift to the employer to justify the disparity.
In addition, the Ninth Circuit's approach was correct, in light of its
observation that much of the state's rebuttal evidence was excluded by the
district court,73 including testimony as to legitimate reasons for the state's
reliance on market wage rates. 74 In the absence of such rebuttal evidence,
the Ninth Circuit was forced to address the state's reliance on market rates
as part of its analysis of the prima facie case. Finally, even though the court
used the market defense to reject AFSCME's prima facie case, the tenor of
the opinion suggests that the same outcome would have resulted if the
market defense had been addressed at the rebuttal stage.
2. The Quantum of Proof Necessary to Establish a Prima Facie Case
of Disparate Treatment Under Title VII
The most readily accepted proofs of disparate treatment are overt acts by
the employer that demonstrate an intent to treat employees differently
solely because of their gender. For example, in International Union of
70. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 359, n.45 (1977).
71. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
72. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
73. AFSCME 11, 770 F.2d at 1408.
74. Brief for Appellants at 38, AFSCME H, 770 F.2d 1401(9th Cir. 1985).The Brieffor Appellants
noted the state's attempts to present evidence of legitimate reasons for its reliance on market rates.
These included recruitment and retention of qualified employees, provision of the best services for the
tax dollar, and maintaining a fair and uniform system of compensation. Most of this testimony was




Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,75
the court held that the employer's policy of deliberately segregating its
workforce on the basis of sex and maintaining a lower wage curve for
classifications primarily filled by women would, if proven, constitute a
violation of the Civil Rights Act.76 Other courts have found overt discrimi-
nation in practices such as paying employees' retirement benefits on the
basis of sex-based mortality tables, 77 or refusing to hire women with
preschool children, while hiring men with preschool children, without
justifying such a policy as a bona fide business necessity. 78 In such cases,
the discriminatory motive was clear from the employer's action itself, and
courts did not hesitate to allow the remedies available under Title VII.
a. Comparable Worth as Evidence of Discriminatory Intent
The extent to which comparable worth analysis contributes to the estab-
lishment of a prima facie case may be determined by beginning with
"pure" comparable worth claims, and then by considering additional
factors that may indicate discriminatory intent. The term "pure" compara-
ble worth usually refers to the claim that evidence of wage disparities
between jobs of comparable worth is conclusive proof of discrimination. 79
Courts have uniformly held that this per se theory of comparable worth does
not adequately support an inference of discriminatory intent, and therefore
cannot be embraced without independent evidence of willful and inten-
tional discriminatory acts. 80
b. Failure to Adjust Wages in Response to Comparable Worth Studies
An employer's failure to implement corrective pay adjustments, when
added to evidence of wage disparities between jobs of comparable worth,
75. 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 967 (1981).
76. Id. at 1097.
77. Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1081 (1983).
78. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971).
79. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees v. County of Nassau, 609 F
Supp. 695,709 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (citing Power v. Barry County, 539 F Supp. 721, 722 (W.D. Mich.
1982)). In County of Wash. v. Gunther, the Supreme Court noted that plaintiff's claims did not require
the Court to undertake a subjective assessment of the value of various jobs or to quantify the effect of sex
discrimination by statistical techniques. 452 U.S. at 181. Courts have taken this cue and refuse to
independently investigate the relative worth of jobs. Spaulding v. University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686,
701 (9th Cir. 1984); Plemer v. Parsons-Gilbane, 713 F.2d 1127, 1134 (5th Cir. 1983); Briggs v. City of
Madison, 536 F. Supp. 435, 446 (W.D. Wis. 1982).
80. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. See also Plemer, 713 F.2d at 1134; American
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees v. County of Nassau, 609 F. Supp. 695, 708
(E.D.N.Y. 1985) (citing Spaulding v. University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686,700 (9th Cir. 1984)); Power v.
Barry County, 539 F. Supp. 721, 726 (W.D. Mich. 1982); Connecticut State Employees' Ass'n v.
Connecticut, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 191, 192-93 (D. Conn. 1983).
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generally does not persuade courts that a prima facie case has been
established. In American Nurses Association v. Illinois,81 the court held
that neither the funding of an evaluative study nor the failure to take
corrective actions upon the findings of the study was probative of discrimi-
natory intent.82 The court reasoned that the law does not obligate an
employer to adopt a new pay structure simply because the study indicates
that different wage rates would be more equitable. 83 In addition, the law
does not require an employer to disregard the labor market, bargaining
demands, or the possibility that some other study might present different
results. 84 Similarly, in Briggs v. City of Madison,85 the court concluded that
regardless of the findings of the employer's own job evaluations, an
employer could pay the wage rates necessary to compete for qualified
applicants. 86
c. Comparable Worth Plus Evidence of Intentional Discrimination
By adding other evidence of discriminatory intent to comparable worth
data, plaintiffs are more likely to convince the court that a prima facie case
of discrimination has been established. 87 Such circumstantial evidence not
only brings the "cold numbers convincingly to life," 88 but supplants the
81. 606 F. Supp. 1313 (N.D. I11. 1985).
82. Id. at 1317-18.
83. Id. at 1317.
84. Id. at 1318.
85. 536 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Wis. 1982).
86. Id. at 447. A contrary outcome was suggested in Bohm v. L.B. Hartz Wholesale Corp., 370
N.W.2d 901 (Minn. App. 1985), where the court stated in dicta that an employer's knowledge of wage
disparities based on its own comparable worth study, and failure to remedy such disparaties, is prima
facie evidence of intent to discriminate. Id. at 907.
Other courts have indicated that a prima facie case requires a showing that an employer has adopted
corrective pay scales and then has deviated from those pay scales. See American Nurses Ass'n., 606 F.
Supp. at 1317; Briggs, 536 F. Supp. at 447 n. 12. This distinction leads to the unfair result that states that
make the effort to implement comparable worth pay scales but deviate from them are prima facie guilty
of acting discriminatorily, while those states which fail to adopt an equitable pay scale, yet have equal
knowledge of disparate pay scales, escape a finding of discriminatory intent. An employer who chooses
not to implement comparable worth pay scales may be more strongly motivated by discrimination than
the employer who implements an equitable pay scale and then deviates from it. An equally unfair
solution would be to force employers to accept a particular interpretation of their own study, when many
other plausible interpretations exist. A more satisfactory distinction, in cases where the employer's
wage-setting ignores comparable worth data, is between cases that involve additional evidence of
intentional discrimination and those that rely solely on the comparable worth data.
87. See, e.g., Spaulding v. University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686, 703 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 511 (1984), where the court, although rejecting the plaintiff's disparate treatment claim, stated in
dicta that statistical evidence of discrimination based on wage disparities could be reinforced by other
supportive facts and testimony recalling experiences of discriminatory treatment.
88. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977).
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need for any inference to be drawn from numbers generated by comparable
worth studies.
For example, in Taylor v. Charley Brothers,89 the court concluded that
predominantly female jobs should have been compensated at ninety per-
cent of the salary paid for male-dominated positions, based on point-factor
evaluations conducted by the plaintiff's expert.90 The court's finding of sex
discrimination was supported by evidence that the employer deliberately
segregated the workforce, and prevented women from accruing seniority
by keeping them on temporary and part-time status for prolonged periods
of time.91 In Lanegan-Grimm v. Library Association of Portland,92 a prima
facie case was established by evidence of wage disparities between similar
jobs and the employer's intentional segregation of the workforce. 93 The
employer rebutted the plaintiffs' allegations with evidence that the jobs
were different. However, the plaintiff ultimately prevailed by showing that
discriminatory remarks by officials of the employer demonstrated that the
rebuttal evidence was simply a pretext for a discriminatory motive. 94
In each of these cases, the plaintiff's prima facie case depended on
supplemental evidence which, together with statistical comparisons of
wages, allowed an inference that sex discrimination was more likely than
not the cause of the wage gap. Evidence of pay disparities between jobs of
comparable worth, alone, would not permit such an inference. To establish
a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, proponents must offer
corroborating evidence of discrimination, in addition to evidence of wage
disparities between jobs of comparable worth.
3. AFSCME's Failure to Provide Sufficient Evidence of Discriminatory
Intent
The Ninth Circuit held that AFSCME did not establish a prima facie case
of disparate treatment because it failed to supply evidence from which to
draw an inference of intentional discrimination. 95 First, the court held,
intent is linked to culpability, and since the state was not responsible for
prevailing wage rates, it could not be held to have been motivated by sex-
based considerations in setting salaries. 96 Proponents of comparable worth
89. 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 602 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
90. Id. at 612.
91. Id. at 613.
92. 560 F. Supp. 486 (D. Or. 1983).
93. Id. at 494.
94. Id.
95. AFSCME II, 770 F.2d at 1407-08.
96. Id. at 1406. In addition, the court noted, to hold the state liable for failing to implement pay
795
Washington Law Review
assert that wage differentials are presumptively due to institutional barriers
and intentional discrimination. 97 This presumption, they argue, is sup-
ported by the existence of a segregated work force 98 and by the continued
use of wage rates influenced by pre-Civil Rights Act wage discrimina-
tion. 99 However, as the Ninth Circuit observed, there are many factors
which could be responsible for the unexplained residual portion of wage
differentials. 100 Therefore, the court was justified in rejecting a presump-
tion of impermissible intent based on the employer's use of market wage
rates, absent more specific evidence of discriminatory intent.
The Ninth Circuit's second reason for rejecting AFSCME's disparate
treatment claim was that the supplemental evidence of intentional discrimi-
nation, added to the statistical evidence of wage disparities, was not
sufficient to provide an inference of discriminatory intent. 101 The district
court in AFSCME I had found two such items of evidence to be persuasive:
historical examples of discriminatory pay practices, and certain admissions
by state officials. 102
a. Historical Evidence of Discriminatory Employment Practices
The district court's opinion in AFSCME I identified two factors demon-
strating the state's historical involvement in employment discrimination.
First, the state had deliberately run help-wanted ads in the "male" and
"female" columns of newspapers as late as 1973.103 Second, prior to the
adjustments in response to comparable worth studies would penalize rather than commend employers
for undertaking comparable worth studies. Id. at 1408.
97. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. However, as one commentator noted, to interpret
residual wage disparities as discrimination requires two very strong assumptions: that all relevant
factors are measured and that all factors are measured without error. WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES, supra
note 12, at 19. Since these assumptions are virtually never satisfied, a degree of doubt emerges as to
empirical explanations of the residual. Id. See also Milkovich, The Emerging Debate, in COMPARABLE
WORTH: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES 42-47 (E. Livernash 2d ed. 1984).
98. Occupational segregation studies illustrate the fact that men and women tend to hold different
types of jobs. Women are substantially more likely to work in clerical and service occupations, and less
likely than men to work in the higher-paying craft and laboring occupations. Milkovich, supra note 97,
at 25. Researchers offer three explanations for the concentration of women in low-paying occupations:
personal choice for reasons other than pay; intentional exclusion of women from high-paying jobs; and
underpayment of jobs solely because women hold them. WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES, supra note 12, at
52. None of these explanations have proven conclusively valid, and the question of why women are
concentrated in a few low-paying occupations remains unresolved. Id. at 52-62.
99. WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES, supra note 12, at 57. See also Blumrosen, supra note 5, at
443-44.
100. AFSCME 1I, 770 F.2d at 1407; see also supra note 63 and accompanying text.
101. AFSCME I, 770 F.2d at 1407.
102. AFSCME 1, 578 F Supp. at 860-63.
103. Id. at 860.
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amendment of Washington's Civil Rights Law in 1971,104 sex discrimina-
tion in employment was not prohibited. 105 The district court surmised that
the state's current employment practices were a manifestation of "centuries
old discriminatory attitudes and practices of a male dominated society." 106
The difficulty with adding historical factors into the sum of evidence
examined in discrimination cases is that it is difficult to ascertain their
present impact. It is possible that discriminatory employment practices in
general, and segregated help-wanted ads in particular, have some impact on
present wage rates, although such practices occurred many years ago. The
probative value of such evidence, however, is weak when considered in
light of other factors that may also explain the disparity. 107 Courts do not
require employers to adjust wage scales that may contain the remnants of
past discrimination, when other nondiscriminatory factors provide equally
plausible explanations forthe present disparity. 108 Even if the court had
found a causal nexus between past discrimination and present wage rates,
AFSCME still might not have prevailed. Courts have held that an inference
of discriminatory intent may not be drawn if the employer's policies
subsequent to the Civil Rights Act have been nondiscriminatory. 109 Since
courts hold that adhering to market rates is not discriminatory, an employer
will not be held liable for the effects of past wage discrimination if its
employment policies are otherwise nondiscriminatory.
b. Admissions by State Officials
The second element of substantiating evidence found significant by the
lower court was the admission by state officials of discriminatory pay
practices. 110 The probative value of those admissions depends on the
104. 1971 WASH. LAWS IsT Ex. SEss., ch. 81 at 551 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.010
(1985)).
105. AFSCMEI, 578 F. Supp. at 1407. The amendment to the State's Law Against Discrimination
preceded the 1972 federal amendment to Title VII, which authorized federal courts to award money
damages in favor of private individuals against a state government. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
106. AFSCMEI, 578 F. Supp. at866n.ll.
107. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
108. Lemons v. City & County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228, 229 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
888 (1980); Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F2d 353, 355-56 (8th Cir. 1977).
109. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 406, 417 (1977) (judgment favoring the
plaintiff's claim of racial discrimination vacated and remanded for a determination of the impact of pre-
Act discrimination and whether the employer discriminated after passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1964); Penk v. Oregon Bd. of Higher Educ., No. 80-436 (D. Or. Feb. 15, 1985) (discriminatory acts
prior to 1972, when Title VII became applicable to the State Board of Higher Education, are not
actionable unless they constitute a continuing violation).
110. AFSCMEI, 578 F. Supp. at 866. The district court found the record replete with statements by
state officials indicating knowledge of sex discrimination in state employment. Id. at 860. Admissions
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overall goals and practices of the state's compensation system. Where a
system strictly adheres to market wage scales, the statements by officials
might amount only to observations that the market tends to compensate
predominantly female occupations less than others. Such statements would
have little probative value because they reflect information that is already
available through comparable worth studies. Therefore, they do not belie
any particular intent on the part of the employer. However, the admission of
discriminatory pay practices may have probative significance when cou-
pled with other evidence that the employer intentionally discriminated
against women. 111 Since the historical evidence of intentional discrimina-
tion in the present case was inconclusive, and since AFSCME failed to
produce other circumstantial evidence of discrimination, 112 statements by
state officials amounted only to observations of widely acknowledged
market disparities. Similarly, legislative efforts to increase pay scales for
certain job categories amount to an admission that market wage rates vary
between occupations, but not to an admission that the state varies its pay
rates because of the sex of its employees.
III. THE FUTURE OF COMPARABLE WORTH
In a recently filed case,1 13 the judge warned the plaintiffs that although
their comparable worth claims were not precluded by the AFSCME II
decision, they faced a "tough row to hoe" in proving discriminatory
also took the form of legislation allocating initial funds towards comparable worth pay scales. Id. at
867.
111. Lanegan-Grimm v. Library Ass'n of Portland, 560 F. Supp. 486,494 (D. Or. 1983); Taylor v.
Charley Bros., Inc., 25 FEP Cases 602,612 (W.D.Pa. 1981). See also Wilkins v. University of Houston,
654 F.2d 388,406 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated, 459 U.S. 822 (1982) (remanded for reconsideration in light
of supervening decisions in Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 272 (1982) and General Tel. Co. v.
Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982), which narrowed the standard of review as to both ultimate and subsidiary
facts and which tightened the requirements for class certification). Statements by employers reflecting
discriminatory intent may also take on added significance when combined with evidence of intentional
segregation of the workforce.
112. Another aspect of corroborative evidence referred to, but not elaborated upon, by the district
court was the State's use of subjective standards in determining pay. AFSCME 1, 578 F. Supp. at 863.
This evidence does not add to the quantum of proof because the character of the subjective practices,
and their probative weight, was not established as a finding of fact. The plaintiff identified the subjective
practice as the indexing of over 2000 job classifications to benchmarks based on market surveys of only
3% of those classifications. Plaintiff's Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at
7, AFSCME H, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985). The plaintiffs also asserted that the indexing results were
often modified for historical or other reasons. Id. If such evidence had been accepted by the trial court, it
would likely suffice to establish a prima facie case because it supplies an inference of discriminatory
intent. In such a case, plaintiffs could persuasively argue that the preservation of historical pay
relationships is an impermissible goal of an employer's wage policies, because it "operates to freeze the
status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices." Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430.
113. California State Employees' Ass'n v. California, No. C-84-7275-MHP (N.D. Cal., Memo-
randum Decision and Order of Sept. 13, 1985) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file).
798
Comparable Worth
intent. 114 The AFSCME II decision, and the large majority of cases ad-
dressing comparable worth, make it clear that the plaintiff's task is vir-
tually impossible without corroborating proof of intentional discrimina-
tion. This assessment is supported by the courts' uniform rejection of
disparate impact analysis in such claims, and their acceptance of the market
defense to disparate treatment claims. Since it is difficult to establish a
comparable worth claim in the courts, it makes sense for proponents to
pursue the issue in other forums.
A. The Appropriateness of Addressing Comparable Worth in
Nonjudicial Forums
Settlements negotiated by unions and legislatures are preferable to court
decrees for two reasons. First, courts have been restrained by the legislative
history of Title VII which was virtually silent on the question of Title VII's
coverage of sex discrimination and comparable worth claims. 115 Courts
have therefore looked to the history of the Equal Pay Act, 116 which was
passed just one year before the Civil Rights Act,1 17 to ascertain Congres-
sional intent. 118 In drafting the Equal Pay Act, Congress rejected proposals
that would have added a requirement of equal pay for comparable work to
the Act's prohibition against unequal pay for equal work.1 19 Proponents of
comparable worth argue that the Civil Rights Act should be construed more
broadly than the Equal Pay Act, given Congress' broad definition of equal
employment opportunity as a means of undoing discrimination. 120 In
deciding whether to extend the Civil Rights Act to a controversial theory of
recovery, however, courts will likely continue to use caution due to the
paucity of the Act's legislative history, and to the contrary intent expressed
in the legislative history of the Equal Pay Act.
114. Galante, 'Comparable Worth' Decision Sidestepped by Judge in Calif., Nat'l L.J., Oct. 7,
1985, at 30, col. 3.
115. AFSCME 11, 770 F.2d at 1404; see also General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 143
(1976).
116. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1982).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
118. See, e.g., Gunther, 452*U.S. at 170-71.
119. 109 CONG. REc. 9194-208 (1963). Representative Goodell, reflecting on the use of the word
"equal" instead of the word "comparable," stated that in orderfor the statute to apply the jobs involved
"should be virtually identical." Id. at 9197.
During consideration of the Civil Rights Act a year later, a late amendment by a principal opponent of
the bill added sex as an impermissible factor in employment decisions. 110 CONG. REc. 2577 (1964).
Commentators observe that the amendment's objective was to block passage of the bill, not to protect
women's employment rights. Kanowitz, Sex-BasedDiscrimination in American Law 111: Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 20 HAST. L.L 305, 310 (1968).
120. In Gunther, the Court noted legislative history broadly defining equal employment oppor-
tunity. 452 U.S. at 178 (citing S. REP. No. 867, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1964)).
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A second reason for exploring comparable worth in nonjudicial forums
is that unions, city councils, and state legislatures are more appropriate
forums for action where the source and dimensions of the perceived
problem are uncertain. In the case of a comparable worth claim that is
unaccompanied by corroborative evidence of discrimination, plaintiffs
would replace proof of the employer's discriminatory intent with a pre-
sumption of discriminatory intent derived from comparable worth data.
Such a presumption may be proper in nonjudicial forums, where decision-
makers can weigh societal values and competing interests to determine the
extent to which society is willing to act in the face of the uncertainties
surrounding comparable worth claims. However, courts cannot tolerate
such uncertainties when the legislative intent is unclear and when the
impact of factors besides discriminatory intent can account for wage
disparities with only limited accuracy.
Legislative enactments and appropriations indicate that the public man-
date in Washington State perhaps favored wage scales based on comparable
worth. 121 However, it is not clear whether Title VII embodies a legislative
or public mandate to legally force employers to adjust their wage scales in
response to their own comparable worth studies. The courts traditionally
provide a remedy only where discrimination is adequately proven, and the
party responsible for the alleged harm is reasonably identifiable.
B. The Likelihood of Success in Nonjudicial Forums
Evidence that comparable worth may succeed in public forums is found
in the events surrounding the AFSCME I and AFSCME II cases. With the
support of Governor Booth Gardner, the Washington State Legislature
appropriated forty-five million dollars to settle the claims of the AFSCME
plaintiffs, to develop a new indexing structure that reflects the evaluated
worth of job classes, and to compensate selected job categories that are
paid far below their evaluated worth. 122 This appropriation was arguably
influenced by pressure from AFSCME's lawsuit. However, even after the
Ninth Circuit rejected AFSCME's claim, the parties negotiated a $482
million settlement which will be applied over the next six years to upgrade
the salaries of workers found to be underpaid according to the comparable
worth guidelines. 123
121. See 1977 WASH. LAWS 1ST Ex. SESS., ch. 152 at 563-64 (calling for additional compensation
to eliminate dissimilarities in wages between jobs of comparable worth); see also supra note 35 and
accompanying text.
122. 1985 WASH. LAWS, 1ST SESS. 2378.
123. Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 6, 1986, at 19, col. 1. The settlement was approved by the
Washington State Legislature on January 31, 1986. Burt, Legislature OK's Comparable-Worth Plan,




Similar gains have occurred in other states. Minnesota passed legislation
requiring its municipalities to provide employees with equal pay for jobs of
comparable worth. 124 New Mexico, acting without the aid of comparable
worth studies, appropriated funds to raise the salaries of its lowest paid
workers, eighty-six percent of whom are females. 125 Fourteen states cur-
rently have statutes prohibiting employers from discriminating in the pay-
ment of wages between sexes, or from compensating females less than
males for work of comparable character. 126
Proponents of comparable worth have also met with some success at the
bargaining table. In 1981 members of AFSCME went on strike against the
City of San Jose over the issue of comparable worth. A pay hike of $4.8
million was negotiated, of which $1.45 million was reserved for increasing
the salaries of underpaid women. 127 In Connecticut, 7000 health care
workers represented by the New England Health Care Employees' Union
negotiated a contract calling for a pay equity fund aimed at making health
care salaries higher in relation to wages in male-dominated fields. 128 These
developments, in contrast to the general lack of success in legal forums,
indicate that the future of comparable worth lies in legislative and collective
bargaining processes.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit was correct in holding that AFSCME failed to estab-
lish a prima facie case of sex-based wage discrimination, because the use of
market wage rates, alone, is not sufficient evidence of discriminatory
intent. The tenor of the AFSCME I decision and other federal decisions
suggests that any optimism for comparable worth as proof of sex discrimi-
nation under Title VII is largely unfounded. Courts require a very substan-
tial showing of discriminatory intent in addition to the inferences drawn
from comparable worth studies. Finally, in the absence of evidence of
intentional discrimination, comparable worth claims should be addressed
in public forums which are better suited to handle the uncertainties inherent
in identifying and solving pay inequities.
The most urgent question remains unanswered: why are predominantly
male positions paid twenty percent more than predominantly female oc-
cupations? Sex discrimination is invariably among the factors supplied by
by United States District Court Judge Jack Tanner. McConnell, Judge Puts Seal On Comparable Worth,
Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Apr. 12, 1986, at Al, col. 1.
124. PAY EQUITY AND COMPARABLE WOT, supra note 4, at 58.
125. Remick, An Update on Washington State, 10 PuB. PERSONNEL MGMT. L 392 (1984).
126. PAY EQurry AND COMPARABLE WORM, supra note 4, at 58.
127. BuREAu OF NATONAL AFFAIRS, THE COMPARABLE WoRm IssuE 34 (1981).
128. Id. at 33-34. "
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scholars to explain the disparity. Proponents of comparable worth assert
that sex discrimination originates with or is perpetuated by employers, and
its dimensions are defined by the salary differences between predominantly
male jobs and predominantly female jobs of comparable worth. The re-
sponse of the courts, unsatisfactory as it may be to claimants, is that the
origin and dimensions of sex-based wage discrimination cannot be identi-
fied, absent other evidence of discriminatory intent, because both are
interwoven with legitimate factors which at least partially explain the
disparity. The sweeping reforms ordered by the district court in AFSCME I
should, where evidence further defining the scope of the discrimination is
unavailable, await a clear legislative mandate.
Brendan Mangan
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